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UP IN SMOKE: FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS AND THE BURGER COURT 
GERALD A. REAMEY* 
In at least some ways, the Burger Court did what it was expected to do.' 
In other ways, it surprised both supporters and detractors.2 
When Warren Burger was appointed Chief Justice in 1969 by President 
Nixon, he was expected to lead the Supreme Court away from its liberal, 
value-laden approach to constitutional adjudication. 3 Many commentators 
anticipated that this shift would be accompanied by the overruling of the 
most odious (to conservatives) vestiges of the Warren Court era. 4 
A retrospective of the court's work during the seventeen years Warren 
Burger served as Chief Justice reveals the expected conservative trend of the 
Chief Justice himself,5 as well as the Supreme Court generally.6 It does not, 
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I. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J . Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger 
Court: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103 (1989) (appoint-
ment of conservative Justices led to more conservative voting on civil rights issues); Geoffrey 
R. Stone, The Selective Activism of the Burger Court, A.B.A. J ., June 15 , 1986, at 10, 10 
(vol. 72) (Burger Court sided with individual on civil liberties issues in 410Jo of decisions to 
Warren Court's 66%). 
2. This surprise is reflected in the title to a leading book chronicling the work of the Court 
during Warren Burger's tenure as Chief Justice. See THE BURGER CoURT: THE CouNTER-
REvoLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) [hereinafter CouNTER-REvoLUTION THAT 
WASN'r]; see also Peter W. Lewis et al., The Burger Court and Searches Incident to a Lawful 
Arrest: The Current Perspective, 7 CAP. U. L. REv. I, 5 (1977) (those who predicted or hoped 
for overruling of Warren Court decisions may have been disappointed); Gene R. Nichol, Jr. 
An Activism of Ambivalence, 98 HARv. L. REv. 315, 315 (1984) (reviewing The Burger Court: 
The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't) (Burger Court less conservative than some commentators 
had predicted or feared). · 
3. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note I, at 106; Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 4-5; Transcript 
of the President's Announcement of Two Nominees for the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 
22, 1971, at 24. 
vii . 
/d. 
4. See Anthony Lewis, Forward, in COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T, supra note 2, at 
When Warren E. Burger succeeded Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United 
States in 1969, many expected to see the more striking constitutional doctrines of 
the Warren years rolled back or even abandoned. The reapportionment cases, 
Brown v. Board of Education and the other decisions against racial discrimination, 
the criminal law decisions imposing what amounted to a code of fair procedure 
on the states, the cases enlarging the freedom of speech and of the press: In these, 
it was often said, the Warren Court has made a constitutional revolution. Now a 
counter-revolution was seemingly at hand. 
S. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note I, at 106 (Burger more conservative on civil liberties 
issues than all other Justices except Rehnquist) . 
6. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note I, at 104, 106. 
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however, reflect wholesale rejection of the most controversial civil liberties 
decisions rendered by the Warren Court.' It is also unclear that Chief Justice 
Burger was responsible for the Court's retrenchment on civil liberties where 
it did occur. 
Warren Burger has been described as a man of "limited capacity and no 
discernible coherent philosophy.' '8 To the extent this description is accurate, 
it is less likely that the Chief Justice "led" the Court away from civil liberties 
and more likely that he simply added his own vote to that of colleagues 
with a clearer vision and more defined agenda. 
If one tries to discern a strategy in the restructuring of civil liberties, and 
especially search and seizure rulings, several conclusions are possible. One 
might conclude that the Burger Court was fragmented, and that various 
combinations of Justices approached different issues in different ways9 so 
that no unified strategy was possible. 10 Or one might deduce instead that the 
"strategy" for change was cleverly subtle, making the Court's decision appear 
to be born of hopeless disagreement while they were instead the product of 
a patient and relentless pursuit of "law and order." 
A paranoid mind is not required to adopt the latter view, but experience 
with group decision making would make one skeptical that disharmony could 
be orchestrated so skillfully. A more tempered view might be that the Burger 
Court lacked the moral compass and conceptualization skills of the Warren 
Court, 11 but moved nevertheless, and against the will of the minority, in a 
common direction. There may well have been no "mastermind" orchestrating 
this "strategy" but instead a group of single-minded Justices who simply 
had the same goal in each case and went about achieving it in different, but 
collectively effective, ways. Disharmonious groups often do move in discern-
ible patterns toward goals targeted by a few of their members. When the 
Supreme Court does this, it may be because of the strong leadership of its 
Chief Justice, or it may be because one or more of the associate Justices is 
7. See Nichol, supra note 2; Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-
Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory 
Practices, in CouNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WAsN'T, supra note 2, at 62, 91; Jerold H. Israel, 
Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. 
REv. 1320, 1324 (1977) (Burger Court has not undermined most of the basic accomplishments 
of Warren Court in protecting civil liberties). 
8. Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in CouNTER-REvoLUTION 
THAT WASN'T, supra note 2, at 198, 211. 
9. See Robert S. Irons, The Burger Court: Discord in Search and Seizure, 8 U. RICH. L. 
REv. 433 , 434 (1974) (disagreement on Fourth Amendment issues indicates "profound cleavages 
in fundamental concepts among the Justices"). 
10. Since fragmentation virtually always exists within the Supreme Court, adoption of this 
view might logically lead one to the further conclusion that Warren Burger lacked the consensus-
building skills necessary to lead the Court in any particular direction. Considering the strong 
personalities that often populate the Supreme Court, Burger's job might have been like that of 
the proverbial law school dean for whom leadership resembles an effort to herd cats. 
II. Professor Vincent Blasi contrasts the Warren and Burger courts by noting, "The Warren 
Court 's activism was different . In that era the Justices had a moral vision and an agenda." 
Blasi, supra note 8, at 216. 
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working effectively to advance his or her agenda. Even the Warren Court, 
which seems monolithic by comparison with its successor Court, is an example 
of this phenomenon. 
Commentators have noted Earl Warren's ability to produce consensus, at 
least regarding result, on highly controversial legal issues. 12 If Warren Burger 
was less able to achieve unanimity, or even much uniformity, he was nev-
ertheless arguably able to achieve the effect he desired in Fourth Amendment 
law. 13 The Warren Court stood for certain principles; the conservative element 
of the Burger Court appeared to stand for one: find a way to put the 
criminal defendant in jail and keep him there. 14 
Numerous ways were found to do this "individual justice," and the net 
result was the diminution of individual privacy rights. It was not pretty, but 
it worked. 15 And in the end, it is hard to say the Court's splintered decisions 
have had any less impact on the evolution of the Fourth Amendment than 
12. Professor Leon Friedman characterized the Chief Justice in this way: "Earl Warren was 
an effective presider over conference sessions - a practiced persuader, compromiser, a cajoler, 
if necessary, to get the required votes. He also was the moral leader of a Court that made or 
started fundamental, even revolutionary, changes in American law and politics." Leon Friedman, 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: The Community 's Protector, 72 A.B.A. J ., June 15, 1986, at 
14, 14. 
13. The most notable exception, of course, is in the exclusionary rule. Chief Justice Burger, 
but not the Court as a whole, would have abandoned the rule entirely, presumably overruling 
Mapp v. Ohio, 368 U.S. 871 (1960). While the Court never came to this position, its decisions 
during Burger's tenure greatly undermined the effectiveness of the rule. See Albert W. Alschuler, 
Foiled Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1436, 1443-44 (1987). 
It must also be noted that Warren Burger may not have been "achieving" this result any 
more than a rider can be said to control the bus . The Chief Justice may have been just one 
more vote among the growing number who for their own reasons favored affirmance of 
convictions in search and seizure cases. 
14. This view that the Warren Court was "principled" may be merely the result of the more 
open stand the Court took on issues. It overruled anachronistic cases and announced sweeping 
decisions written in the most general language with a decidedly moral tone. The Warren Court 
may not in reality have been so much more a defender of the Fourth Amendment, or other 
rights of those suspected of crime; it may simply have more often dealt with high-flown 
principles about which there could be little disagreement. It is, after all, the specific cases that 
test one's beliefs. 
Yale Kamisar concludes that the Warren Court did not advance the rights of the accused so 
much as is commonly believed. Speaking of the Court, he wrote: 
Although it was often accused of being overly solicitous of criminal suspects, the 
Warren Court legitimated challenged law enforcement tactics on more occasions 
than is generally realized. Despite its public reputation as a bold, crusading court, 
more often than not its criminal procedure decisions reflected a pattern of mod-
eration and compromise. 
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 63. 
15. Professor Wasserstrom has expressed this view in much the same way: 
What the Court is doing to the fourth amendment does not, in my view, make a 
very pretty picture. But at least this much can be said for those decisions: They 
accomplish their purpose of enhancing the coercive and investigative power of the 
police in a far more direct and forthright way than do decisions tampering with 
the exclusionary rule. 
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv . 257, 
400 (1984). 
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did the more sweeping, graceful, and principled creations of the Warren 
Court. 16 
The fact that a series of decisions significantly impacts an area of law 
does not necessarily reveal or define either a strategy or an agenda of the 
decision maker. It does, however, provide at least some slight evidence of 
both. One plausible explanation for the achievement of a goal (like the 
advancement of law enforcement interests over privacy rights) is that a 
strategy underlay the accomplishment. 17 Consistent outcomes are unlikely to 
be the product of serendipitous coincidence, and the consistent use of a 
particular method of decision making suggests strategy. Where consistency 
of method and a trend toward some goal can be observed together in a 
series of decisions, it is logical to conclude that some conscious strategy is 
at work. 
Further evidence that the Burger Court adopted a Fourth Amendment 
strategy lies in its activism. Despite protestations to the contrary, the Burger 
Court was an activist court, although its brand of activism has been described 
as "rootless." 18 While activism does not necessarily also require a defined 
strategy, no realistic constitutional activist can expect to succeed for long in 
an environment of collegial decision making without employing some strategic 
devices. 
Therefore, if the charge that the Burger Court was "activist" in the area 
of search and seizure law is accepted as true, and if one also accepts the 
premise that a decidedly "law and order" result was achieved in many, if 
not most, of the Court's Fourth Amendment cases, it should be possible to 
uncover a deliberate "strategy" or method of decision making in what 
otherwise appears to be an odd collection of pluralistic holdings. 
Because these clues of a strategy are found in the Fourth Amendment 
decisions of the Burger Court, it is unlikely that the changes in approach to 
individual privacy "just happened." While it may never be possible to discern 
which Justices of the Court devised or implemented this strategy (if it was 
a strategy), it might at least be possible to describe what the strategy was 
and anticipate how it might be used in the future. If this "strategy" existed 
within the Burger Court, does it persist in the Rehnquist Court? And if it 
does, what does its existence mean for the future of the Fourth Amendment? 
The Strategic Use of Confusion in Fourth Amendment Adjudication 
The Burger Court has received some "credit" from notable observers of 
criminal procedure for failing to overrule the best known decisions of the 
Warren Court, the very decisions that apparently prompted President Nixon 
16. See Blasi, supra note 8, at 216 (some of Burger Court's decisions have had "profound 
impact on the political life of the nation"). 
17. Observers who have no faith in happenstance and coincidence prefer such an explanation. 
18. See Blasi, supra note 8, at 198. The fact that the activism of the Burger Court may 
have been "rootless" does not make it less deliberate. As Professor Blasi concludes, "Rootless 
activism is activism nonetheless." /d. at 217 . 
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to appoint Warren Burger. 19 A reader of these commentaries can almost 
hear the collective sigh emanating from the immensely relieved authors who 
could not quite believe that the exclusionary rule, Miranda,20 and other 
protections for those suspected or accused of crime remained intact. 
Of course, these observers understood that much of the infrastructure of 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments had been seriously damaged by 
the Burger Court, 21 but they seemed grateful, and properly so, that the 
principle-laden decisions of the Warren Court era remained at least as 
symbolic reminders of better times.22 Albert Alschuler has characterized this 
period as one of "a prolonged and rather bloody campaign of guerrilla 
warfare" by the Burger Court.23 
This warfare has not generally been seen as part of a strategy to limit the 
Fourth Amendment, but rather as the product of a disjointed effort by a 
Court unable or unwilling to "chart a clear course. " 24 There are, however, 
reasons to believe that this guerrilla warfare was waged deliberately and 
effectively to accomplish sub silentio what could not be done in the light of 
day. 
For many reasons, the Supreme Court does not recklessly discard unwanted 
precedent in favor of changing, contemporary versions of the Constitution. 25 
19. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1436. Professor Alschuler observed that 
[a)lthough President Nixon had promised to redress Warren Court decisions that 
had favored the " criminal forces" over the "peace forces," the anticipated Burger 
Court counterrevolution in criminal procedure never materialized. The Court 
overruled only one landmark decision of the 1960s due process revolution, and 
some of its decisions notably expanded defendants' protections in criminal cases. 
!d. at 1441. Yale Kamisar also has argued that the record of the Burger Court is much less 
prosecution-oriented than is commonly believed. See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 68. 
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, reh 'g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966). 
21. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1442. 
22. !d. Professor Alschuler observed, "(The Burger Court] typically left the facade of 
Warren Court decisions standing while it attacked these decisions from the sides and under-
neath. " !d. 
23 . !d. 
24. !d. at 1441. Professor Alschuler observed that "[t]he Court 's rulings did not follow the 
path that any single justice would have chosen." ld. at 1437. 
25 . As Professor B.J . George, Jr., reminds us: "No reconstituted Supreme Court ever 
repudiates wholly the doctrines of its predecessors; the doctrine of stare decisis retains enough 
vitality to temper whatever desire there may be to wipe away completely certain inherited 
precedents . This is as true of the Burger Court as of many of its predecessors ." B. J . George, 
Jr., From Warren to Burger to Chance: Future Trends in the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, 12 CRIM. L. BuLL. 253, 254 (1976). A more cynical view is reflected in the comment 
of Professor Alschuler: 
The Supreme Court has a larger constituency than purist law professors - a 
constituency that knows little of the Court's dubious doctrinal distinctions. When 
two-thirds of a prior decision disappears slowly in half a dozen small bites, the 
public's perception of the Supreme Court may not change very much. Were the 
Court to swallow the disfavored precedent in a gulp, however, the impression that 
constitutional law is no more than the preference of five justices might grow 
stronger. 
Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1452-53. 
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Predictability is an important stabilizing factor that cannot be casually 
undermined in the name of expediency.26 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment 
embodies fundamental principles which, at least in general terms, have a 
stature that makes more difficult any overt effort to abandon themY These 
factors militate in favor of surreptitious alteration and diminution of an-
nounced doctrine rather than abrupt abandonment, even if that doctrine was 
highly controversial or widely disfavored when it was announced.28 
Although numerous examples exist of this "sniping" at the Fourth Amend-
ment, and at other protections within the Bill of Rights,29 two of these 
examples sufficiently illustrate the directions taken by the Burger Court in 
adjudicating search and seizure cases. One is the development of "bright-
line rules." The other is the expanded use of reasonableness as the touchstone 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
It may appear at first glance that these lines of analysis are philosophically 
inconsistent with each other. "Bright lines" connote simplicity and improved 
understanding, especially by law enforcement personnel. "Reasonableness," 
on the other hand, is virtually synonymous with flexible but ad hoc decision 
making. In reality, both forms were employed by the Court to confuse and 
conceal. "Bright-line" rules complicated the task of law enforcement per-
sonnel and led to diminished understanding of the standards by which their 
searches would be judged. The "reasonableness" analysis consistently pro-
duced procedural and substantive "wins" for the government, not the so-
phisticated, context-based reasoning that might have resulted.30 
One appreciates the sweep of these processes by considering the structure 
of the Fourth Amendment and the way it has been enforced. The amendment 
itself is usually viewed as consisting of two principal components: the "prob-
able cause and warrant" clause and the "reasonableness" clause. 31 The 
requirement that a search or seizure be ''reasonable'' has been given an 
independent and coequal status with the more venerable (and obvious) 
"probable cause and warrant" clause.32 "Bright-line" rules are usually for-
26. Oliver Wendell Holmes regarded prophecies about what courts will do in a given case 
as the equivalent of " law." See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 
457, 458 (1897). 
27. See California v. Hodari D. , Ill S. Ct. 1547, 1562 (1991) (Stevens, J ., dissenting) 
(Fourth Amendment values are "fundamental and enduring"). Every graduate of a high school 
civics class probably agrees in principle with the Bill of Rights. It is the application, and not 
the theory, of the rights that often meets with disapproval. 
28 . The Miranda warnings are so well known to readers, moviegoers, and television viewers 
that the abandonment of the requirement might well be felt as a loss by the public. Practically 
speaking, overruling Miranda might have very little effect on the use of the warnings in criminal 
investigation, whatever its impact might be on the admissibility of evidence. 
29. See Alschuler, supra note 13; Israel, supra note 7. 
30. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional 
Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988) (proposing increased use of context-based balancing to determine 
reasonableness). 
31. See Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 8-9; Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 281. The 
particularity requirement has been intentionally omitted for purposes of this discussion. 
32. See George, supra note 25, wherein the author observes, "[a] majority of the Court 
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mutated to apply exceptions to the "probable cause and warrant" clause. 
Manipulation of the requirement for reasonableness, taken with the creation 
of bright-line rules governing exceptions to the probable cause and warrant 
requirements, therefore carries the potential for greatly modifying the way 
in which the Fourth Amendment is applied. 
Reasonableness: A License to Kill (The Fourth Amendment) 
Warren Burger did not invent reasonableness, nor was he the first to 
introduce it in a Fourth Amendment case. The Warren Court subjected the 
amendment to a reasonableness analysis in Terry v. Ohio33 the year before 
Warren Burger became Chief Justice.34 
In Terry, an experienced police officer observed two men who appeared 
to be "casing" a store for a robbery attempt. When the officer approached 
the men and made inquiries, they "mumbled something" in response. Officer 
McFadden then patted down the outer clothing of one of the suspects. He 
felt a pistol and removed it from the man's overcoat pocket. A similar 
search of the man's companion uncovered another revolver. The men were 
charged with carrying concealed weapons. 
Terry presented an opportunity to break the bonds of probable cause. One 
way for the Supreme Court to uphold the detention and search of the 
suspects in Terry was to embrace for the first timel5 the position that not 
every search or seizure required probable cause, that something less would 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment if that something was reasonable. 36 The Court 
seized its chance and forever changed the face of the amendment. 
The Terry Court might have avoided the reasonableness analysis and still 
upheld the stop and search. It might, for instance, have characterized the 
stop of the suspects in Terry as less than a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. Or it might have concluded that Officer McFadden's observations 
gave him probable cause to believe that the men he observed were about to 
appears to have reverted to the long-standing tradition, stated in Rabinowitz, that the two 
clauses of the fourth amendment stand on equal footing, and that election between them lies 
in the province of investigating officers." /d. at 264. 
33. 392 u.s. 1 (1%8). 
34. Professor Jerold Israel suggests that Terry may have marked a change in the Warren 
Court's view of the exclusionary rule and how the rule implements society's views of law 
enforcement. See Israel, supra note 7, at 1346-47. The upshot of his observation seems to be 
that, had Earl Warren remained in office, the Court would have taken much the same 
prosecution-oriented path that it took under Warren Burger. 
35 . Terry v. Ohio was not literally the first time the Supreme Court had approved a seizure 
on less than probable cause. It had done so in border search cases, for example. But border 
searches are sui generis; their approval rests upon state sovereignty principles. Terry was the 
first instance in which the Court approved a nonconsensual search for evidence of "street 
crime" without requiring probable cause or some substitute for it. 
36. For a discussion on the rise of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment adjudication, 
including the significance of Terry v. Ohio in the history of the amendment, see Gerald S. 
Reamey, When 'Special Needs' Meet Probable Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 300-05 (1992). 
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commit an armed robbery. Instead, the Court deliberately chose to invoke 
reasonableness as the justification for the stop and frisk, admitting that the 
officer had less than probable cause and that the brief detention was a 
"seizure. " 37 In retrospect, this more expansive, conceptual change seems 
entirely consistent with the Warren Court's approach to decision making, 
even if the result was decidedly prosecution-oriented. 38 
The Supreme Court's determination of what is "reasonable" in a given 
situation necessarily involves a largely subjective determination based on the 
facts revealed by a trial transcript. To avoid the appearance that this deter-
mination is as ad hoc and subjective as it might be, the Court from the 
beginning discussed reasonableness in coldly analytical, almost scientific terms. 39 
The qualitative analysis of reasonableness was said to turn on a careful 
balancing of the privacy interests of the individual in a given situation against 
the law enforcement interests of society.40 . 
This pseudoscientific cost-benefit paradigm helped first the Warren Court, 
then the Burger Court, and now the Rehnquist Court, to take a much freer 
hand in shaping the contours of the Fourth Amendment. The advantages of 
this approach are several, and they are important. First, the Court is able 
to give full weight to the complexities of search and seizure issues, to consider 
the ''myriad daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each 
other on the street. " 41 If something less than probable cause and a warrant 
is constitutionally acceptable, the analytical formula used to determine ac-
ceptability must be able to account for variable levels of suspicion as well 
as a whole range of competing interests in requiring prior judicial approval. 42 
When Chief Justice Warren wrote in Terry that "[e]ach case of this sort 
will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts," 43 he merely acknowl-
edged the range of inquiry required to implement a more sophisticated 
"sliding scale" approach to decision making.44 If reasonableness analysis 
accommodates these variables, it better deals with reality than by trying to 
judge every situation by the less flexible probable cause and warrant formula. 
It also potentially removes the temptation to modify definitions or create 
more exceptions to the general rule.45 
37 . See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 7-8, 16-19 (1968) . 
38. See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 64. 
39. See Reamey, supra note 36, at 301-02. (balancing connotes objectivity and suggests 
scientific approach); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the 
Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 429 (1988) (balancing requires normative 
judgments despite efforts to give them scientific or mathematical thrust). 
40. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S . I, 26-27 (1968). 
41 . !d. at 12 (1968). 
42. Logically, the Supreme Court should even be willing to deny permission to search in 
some cases in which probable cause exists . See Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 310. 
43 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I , 30 (1968). 
44. Terry is significant in that it signalled the Court's willingness to adopt a "sliding scale" 
to determine reasonableness. See Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 309 (Terry can be read as a 
move toward a sliding scale approach). 
45 . Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), is just one example of tailoring the 
definition of probable cause to fit the problem. Camara presented the issue of whether traditional 
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Moreover, a context-based reasonableness analysis lends persuasive force 
to Supreme Court holdings by expanding the decisional alternatives available 
to the Justices. Presumably, consensus would be more readily found for 
outcomes, although pluralistic opinions would likely also result. Professor 
Alschuler described the dilemma of having only a narrow range of judicial 
options when he wrote: 
A court's central obligation is to provide fair straightforward 
judicial interpretations of the law and principled resolutions of 
disputes. Litigants and the larger audience of bystanders are 
entitled to honest and coherent statements of reasons. When a 
court must choose either to abandon a prior ruling or to limit 
this ruling in a way that makes the law an ass, the time usually 
has come for abandonment. 46 
Adopting a reasonableness model opens immeasurably the decision making 
possibilities. It allows a court to begin finely sculpting the law instead of 
chiseling only rough features. It is also easier for a court to avoid making 
the law an ass without abandoning a prior ruling. 
Unfortunately, for all of the benefits to be gained by sophisticated, 
narrowly focused adjudication, the method also contains the potential to do 
great harm. Used unwisely or inexpertly, or with bad motive, the search for 
reasonableness can undermine public confidence in decision making; obscure, 
ignore, or chip away at sound principles; and promote unprincipled activism. 
Public confidence in decisions made by the Supreme Court is probably 
not eroded by small "course corrections"; indeed, it may be enhanced.47 
However, if a court reaches the same result time and again after purporting 
to engage in complex analysis, the public eventually perceives that something 
is amiss.48 The public may not disagree with the results reached; it may even 
probable cause and a search warrant were necessary to conduct an administrative search for 
building code violations. The Supreme Court held firmly to its position that probable cause and 
a warrant were required, but modified the definition of probable cause to eliminate the need 
for individualized suspicion in certain code enforcement searches. /d. at 534-36. A search warrant 
was required, but again, no individualized suspicion was required. Justice White, writing in 
Camara, hinted at the incipient ascent of reasonableness: 
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private 
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is 
still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contem-
plated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. 
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to criminal 
investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. 
It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here 
at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy. 
/d. at 539 (citations omitted). 
46. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1452. 
47. See id. at 1453-54. 
48 . As Professor Alschuler noted, "The open disapproval of past precedents might in fact 
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applaud the decisions. But like the fans of a football team that won because 
the refereeing was consistently in favor of the winners, the victory is a hollow 
one.49 
Prolonged examination of the kinds of facts required in reasonableness 
analysis also affects the public's perception of the process in another way. 
A court consumed with detail, balancing first one set of facts and then 
another to decide whether the Fourth Amendment is offended, appears more 
like a system operator than a system engineer. so Such a tribunal seems 
disinterested in the principles of the Constitution, and engaged instead in 
the day-to-day processing of casesY The purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
is eventually forgotten completely in this mechanical weighing of facts,S2 and 
even members of the Supreme Court may find it harder to remember the 
shape of the forest. 
A decline in interest in principles may also be accompanied by an increase 
in interest in results, but it is probably impossible to tell which causes the 
other. A court with a clear idea of the outcomes it believes to be correct 
must be tempted by processes that relieve it from the burden of explaining 
in each case how that outcome is dictated by the application of principles 
that are at odds with its goal. Reasonableness analysis is by nature more 
manipulable than even semirigid doctrine. The temptation to use it, and to 
use it often, as an engine for change must be great. sJ Conscientious balancing 
can be difficult work, but its ease relative to formulating a coherent philos-
ophy may impel justices to prefer the former. 
On a more practical level, decisions based on reasonableness fail to provide 
guidance for those most affected. Police officers, trial judges, attorneys, and 
others engaged in the application of Fourth Amendment doctrine are hard 
undermine the Court's position in American life less than the repeated invocation of disingenuous 
distinctions." Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1453-54. 
49. Needless to say, the fans also have little respect for the game officials. 
50. See Israel, supra note 7. "Opinions that openly balance interests on both sides and rely 
upon multifaceted standards do not "glorify" individual rights or even boldly call to the public 
attention major civil liberties issues." /d. at 1423. 
51. Professor Alschuler observed in this regard: 
Many Americans appear to have rejected the notion that law can be more than a 
flexible device for solving human problems. Some in fact have maintained that 
even the pragmatic vision of law claims too much. Law is a matter of who gets 
what, and rights are the bones over which people fight. Cost-benefit analysis and 
rule skepticism have eclipsed the notion of principles which can assure members 
of a society that they participate in a common civilization and that they play by 
the same rules. 
Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1454. 
52. But see Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to 
Meaningful Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTING L.J. 285, 362 (1991) (reasona-
bleness does not necessarily imply low level of judicial review). 
53. There is reason to believe the Burger court succumbed to this temptation. See Blasi, 
supra note 8, at 199-208; Friedman, supra note 12 (Chief Justice not a "practitioner of 'judicial 
restraint"'). 
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pressed to predict what is "reasonable" and what is not.54 Of course, 
predictability can be gained if the court is clear about how it values competing 
interests and discloses which facts are outcome determinative, and why. 55 
Otherwise, results are predictable only if the Court is willing to consistently 
reach the same result. 56 
Some of the flaws in reasonableness analysis are inherent. Any court 
employing this mode of adjudication is likely, for example, to fail to provide 
sufficient justification for its opinions to overcome a deficiency in predict-
ability. However, many of the potential process disadvantages can be avoided. 
In assessing the work of the Burger Court, it is revealing to survey how the 
Court used and developed reasonableness as an analytical model in search 
and seizure cases. 
While the "Burger Court," or at least the Supreme Court including Warren 
Burger, did not decide Terry v. Ohio,57 the reasonableness doctrine was 
certainly cultivated and expanded during the years in which Warren Burger 
was Chief Justice. There are three ways in which the Court employed 
reasonableness to judge (or not judge) Fourth Amendment cases: (1) as a 
way to review searches substantively; (2) as a way to define "search"; and 
(3) as a procedural screening device. 
The "Substantive" Use of Reasonableness 
The "substantive" use of reasonableness is illustrated by Terry v. Ohio 
and its progeny, of which there are now many. Following the decision in 
Terry, numerous balancing cases were decided in "quasi-search" situations, 
most of which involved administrative or regulatory inspections or searches 
not directly aimed at the detection of criminal evidence. 
Chief Justice Burger himself wrote the seminal decision in one of these 
cases, South Dakota v. Opperman. 58 Opperman permitted police to impound 
an automobile and inventory its contents without probable cause or a warrant 
because the procedure was not "unreasonable. " 59 In reaching this result, the 
54. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 30, at 48 ("individualized, retrospective bal-
ancing provides little prospective direction to police officers, who presumably need clear rules 
to guide their decisions"); cf. Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1310 (1981). (Court's primary formulation 
leaves police and courts without standards to guide their conduct). 
55. Unfortunately, this is rarely done. See T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Constitutional Law in 
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J . 943, 976 (1987). 
56. See Reamey, supra note 36, at 328 (always reaching the same result completely abdicates 
the judicial role in "deciding" cases). 
57. 392 U.S. I (1968). 
58. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). Opperman was the first true automobile inventory case. The 
Supreme Court laid the groundwork for inventory in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). 
It was not until Opperman was decided that the ideas swirling through the Dombrowski opinion 
gelled into a new and identifiable probable cause and warrant exception. The approach of 
Opperman in permitting a warrantless search without probable cause was, however, a consid-
erable departure from the typical Warren Court search decision. See Israel, supra note 7, at 
1396-97. 
59. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376. 
68 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:57 
Chief Justice balanced the government's interest in safety, protection of the 
owner's property, and shielding police from false claims of theft or loss 
against the automobile owner's privacy interest in the vehicle's contents.60 
Without disputing that the procedure was a search, 61 the Court held it 
reasonable so long as the inventorying agency followed standardized proce-
dures,62 did not have an investigative motive,63 and had lawfully impounded 
the vehicle.64 The search of the car's unlocked glove compartment was 
considered to be within the permissible scope of the valid inventory, 6s but 
the vehicle inventory scope issue was not explored seriously until the Supreme 
Court decided Colorado v. Bertin~ in 1987. 
The Chief Justice wrote for the majority again in a personal effects 
inventory case, Illinois v. LajayetteY This time it was the defendant's 
shoulder bag that was inventoried after he was arrested, but the analysis and 
the result were the same as in Opperman. The arrestee's privacy interests in 
the bag were outweighed by the government's interests in discovering its 
contents; therefore, the inventory was reasonable. 68 
Other lines of cases adopting the reasonableness analysis were decided by 
the Burger Court as well. They, too, dealt with administrative and regulatory 
inspections in a wide variety of settings. In each instance, interests were 
balanced, but always with the same result. 
In the same year Opperman was decided, the Supreme Court, not sur-
prisingly, found it reasonable to search persons at the international border, 
even if no individualized suspicion exists. 69 Several years later, the Court 
moved beyond the border and inventory cases to apply the reasonableness 
standard in evaluating the search of a school student.70 
60. See id. at 369. The validity of these governmental "interests" is crucial in balancing 
persuasively, but the majority opinion in Opperman does not contain any serious justification 
for any of them. See Gerald S. Reamey, Reevaluating the Vehicle Inventory, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 
325, 334-35 (1983). 
61. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 371 n.6. 
62. ld. at 374-76. 
63. ld. at 376; see Larry W. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 
KAN. L. REv. 335, 409 (1978) (Burger found warrant requirement unhelpful in "noncriminal" 
case of vehicle inventory). 
64. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69, 375. 
65 . !d. at 376 n.IO. 
66. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Interestingly, when the Court did consider scope, it went through 
the motions of balancing to adopt what amounted to a "bright-line rule" that t)le inventory of 
unlocked containers within the passenger compartment of a vehicle is per se reasonable. See 
Gerald S. Reamey et al., The Permissible Scope of Texas Automobile Inventory Searches in 
the Aftermath of Colorado v. Bertine: A Talisman is Created, 18 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1165, 
1171-72 (1987). 
67. 462 u.s. 640 (1983). 
68. See id. at 647. In Colorado v. Bertine, then Chief Justice Rehnquist said of Lafayette: 
"In deciding whether this search was reasonable, we recognized that the search served legitimate 
governmental interests similar to those identified in Opperman. We determined that those 
interests outweighed the individual's Fourth Amendment interests and upheld the search." 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. 
69. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976). 
70. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985). 
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The Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.0. 11 smuggled into Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence a new, and eventually talismanic, phrase: "special 
needs."72 Justice Blackmun, concurring in the Court's holding that the 
warrantless search of T.L.O.'s purse required no more than reasonable 
suspicion, invoked the phrase in an apparent attempt to limit the use of 
balancing as a way to circumvent the traditional Fourth Amendment require-
ments: "Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and prob-
able-cause requirement impracticable is a court entitled to substitute its 
balancing of interests for that of the Framers.''73 
A series of "special needs" cases grew from this beginning as the Supreme 
Court repeatedly balanced away probable cause and the warrant requirement 
in cases involving probationers, 74 automobile salvage dealers, 7s government 
workers, 76 railway employees,77 and customs agents. 78 Today, even individu-
alized suspicion is a dispensable component in cases of special need.79 Justice 
Blackmun never intended this use of his invention. 80 He would have limited 
balancing to those cases in which "the practical realities of a particular 
situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant based 
upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search 
would contribute.' '81 
The most striking feature of the cases in which the Court has balanced 
interests to decide reasonableness is the consistency of the results. 82 To date, 
in the special needs cases the Supreme Court has invariably found individual 
privacy rights to be of less weight, has always required less suspicion than 
probable cause, has never imposed a warrant requirement, and has always 
upheld the search that uncovered the damaging evidence.83 As Justice Mar-
shall observed: 
In the four years since this Court, in T.L. 0., first began recog-
nizing "special needs" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, the 
clarity of Fourth Amendment doctrine has been badly distorted, 
as the Court has eclipsed the probable-cause requirement in a 
patchwork quilt of settings: public school principals' searches of 
71. 469 u.s. 325 (1985). 
72. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 
I, 25 (1991) ("special needs" first appeared in New Jersey v. T .L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). 
73. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J ., concurring). 
74. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
15. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
76. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). 
77 . See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
78. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
79. See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 444 (1990); Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 640 (1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989). 
80. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732-48 (1987) (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). 
81. /d. at 741 (Blackmun J., dissenting). 
82. See Reamey, supra note 36, at 320-21. 
83. See id. at 320. 
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students' belongings; public employers' searches of employees' 
desks; and probation officers' searches of probationers' homes. 
Tellingly, each time the Court has found that "special needs" 
counseled ignoring the literal requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment for such full-scale searches in favor of a formless and 
unguided "reasonableness" balancing inquiry, it has concluded 
that the search in question satisfied that test. 84 
The "substantive" application of reasonableness developed by the Burger 
Court has, therefore, not resulted in the kind of sophisticated, context-based 
antiformalism that it might have. Because it has been used to produce the 
same result over and over, it has obscured85 rather than clarified the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. 86 As Justice Marshall noted of these cases, 
"Without the content which those [warrant and probable cause] provisions 
give to the Fourth Amendment's overarching command that searches and 
seizures be 'reasonable,' the Amendment lies virtually devoid of meaning, 
subject to whatever content shifting judicial majorities, concerned about the 
problems of the day, choose to give to that supple term."87 
Justice Marshall's observation reflects another concern raised by the con-
sistent use of reasonableness to uphold searches. That concern is that the 
Supreme Court freely disregards the strictures of the Fourth Amendment 
when it is expedient to aid law enforcement. Case-by-case analysis of the 
sort required to determine reasonableness promotes an uneven weighing of 
interests when social and political pressures can be alleviated by doing so. 88 
Because reasonableness is a vague concept anyway, using it to adjudicate 
search and seizure cases adds neither clarity to the amendment's mandate, 
nor confidence that the mandate is being taken very seriously by the Supreme 
Court. 89 
The use of reasonableness to dilute the Fourth Amendment did not begin 
with the Burger Court, 90 and it has not ended with the Burger Court. 
Nevertheless, it is the Burger Court that had the opportunity to decide 
84. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J ., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
85. See John M. Burkoff, The Court that Devoured The Fourth Amendment: The Triumph 
of an Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 168 (1979) (Burger Court's 
propensity to "balance away" Fourth Amendment rights has been appropriately criticized). 
86. See id. It has, on the other hand, produced predictability of result. 
87. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 637 (1989) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
88. See Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 
38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 909 (1987) (when the Supreme Court balances collective interest in law 
enforcement against personal liberty and due process, privacy loses out). 
89. See Israel, supra note 7, at 1423 (balancing opinions do not glorify individual rights or 
call to the public attention major civil liberties issues); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 30, 
at 48 (" [B]alancing tests are notoriously manipulable. For the very reason that they do not 
provide bright lines, they are subject to slippage when the Court is under political pressure to 
crack down on criminals."). 
90. See Israel , supra note 7, at 1346-47 (Terry may have signalled shift of Warren Court 
back toward mainstream community consensus). 
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whether and how reasonableness would continue to be used, and its decisions 
reflect very few missed opportunities to use it against those persons accused 
of crime. 91 
The Use of Reasonableness to Define "Search" 
The second way in which the Burger Court used reasonableness analysis 
was to define a "search." Here again, it was the Warren Court, and not 
the Burger Court, that introduced reasonableness into the definition just a 
year and a half before Warren Burger became Chief Justice. 
Abandoning the formalistic concept that the Fourth Amendment protected 
only certain defined places, the Warren Court decided Katz v. United States92 
in 1%7. The petitioner in Katz had been convicted of transmitting betting 
information by telephone across state lines.93 Evidence used against the 
petitioner at trial included his own end of the conversation overheard by the 
use of a listening device placed on the outside of the telephone booth.94 
Prior to the decision in Katz, the definition of "search" was closely tied to 
property concepts; a search occurred only if the government intruded into a 
"protected" area.95 The Supreme Court held for the first time in Katz that 
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. " 96 
Rejecting the argument that the outcome turned on whether a trespass 
had occurred, the Court explained that "[t]he Government's activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the 
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and 
thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth 
91. See Stone, supra note 1. Professor Stone noted: 
If there is one area in which the Burger Court's decisions seem most clearly to 
reflect a self-conscious " agenda," it is in the realm of constitutional criminal 
procedure. In construing the " right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" and the 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the Court has hardly missed an 
opportunity to narrow the protections of these guarantees . 
The Burger Court has sided with the government in almost 75 percent of its 
decisions involving the rights of persons suspected of crime. And although the 
Court has not explicitly overruled the most important Warren Court precedents, 
it has severely limited their scope and undermined their effectiveness. 
/d. at 12. Professor Leon Friedman noted the same trend, but attributed it directly to the Chief 
Justice: 
[Chief Justice Burger's] strongest defense of the community's rights over those 
of the individual is, of course, in criminal law. The chief rarely votes in favor of 
an accused . During the 1984-85 Term there were 31 full opinions in the criminal 
area and the chief voted against the government position in only seven. 
Friedman, supra note 12, at 17. 
92. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
93 . /d. at 348. 
94. /d. 
95. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316 
U.S. 129 (1943), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
96. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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Amendment. " 97 Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz refined the opinion by 
introducing the requirement that the expectation of privacy be "reasona-
ble. " 98 Despite Justice Harlan's explanation that no search occurs unless a 
person's expectation of privacy is both subjectively held and one that society 
is prepared to accept as reasonable, 99 the rule is essentially objective. 100 
Reformulating the search definition in reasonableness terms accomplished 
several worthwhile goals. Most importantly, it repudiated the illogic of 
applying the Fourth Amendment only to protected places and persons within 
those places. 101 No longer was the Supreme Court required to limit its prior 
rulings in such ways as to "make the law an ass"; 102 it was able instead to 
consider the reach of the Fourth Amendment in a more realistic, common-
sense fashion. 
Conceptualizing search and seizure more broadly permitted the Court to 
deal effectively with the infinitely variable situations coming before it, in-
cluding those brought about by the advent of new and improved surveillance 
technologies. As was true of reasonableness analysis used substantively to 
decide the constitutional propriety of a search, using reasonableness to define 
"search" avoided rigid, sterile "bright-line" decision making. But as was 
also true, the adoption of reasonableness as a definitional test added to 
confusion rather than clarity about when the Fourth Amendment would 
apply .103 This trade-off is succinctly described in a leading treatise on criminal 
procedure: 
Katz is an extremely important case even outside of electronic 
eavesdropping settings because it marks a movement toward a 
redefinition of the scope of the Fourth Amendment. This is not 
to say that it produced clarity where before there had been 
uncertainty, as the Court substituted for a workable tool that 
often proved unjust a new test which was difficult to apply .104 
Of course, it is not always difficult to apply the Katz test. In the traditional 
"plain view" situation, it is easy to hold that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the evidence of criminal activity he exposes to 
public view. 
The harder cases are those in which a person has what appears to be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his activities but is discovered fortui-
97. /d. at 353 . 
98 . /d. at 361 (Harlan, J . , concurring). 
99. /d. 
100. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 98 (1985); Anthony 
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN . L. REv. 349, 384 (1974); 
John M . Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 515, 527·28 (1984). 
101. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (meaning of "search and seizure" not controlled by law of 
trespass). 
102. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1452. 
103. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 100, at 98 . 
104. /d. 
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tously or by the aid of enhanced senses. 105 The question in such cases seems 
to be whether the privacy expectation was "reasonable" ~n the first place, 
viewed in hindsight and with some regard for whether the conduct of the 
law enforcement agents was consistent with the goal sought to be achieved. 106 
Chief Justice Burger wrote opinions for the majority in two of these hard 
cases in which the Supreme Court used ''reasonable expectation of privacy'' 
to find that no search occurred. 
In the first of these, Illinois v. Andreas, 107 marijuana hidden within a 
wooden table leg was discovered by a customs inspector. 108 The table, which 
was in transit when the marijuana was discovered, was delivered to the 
addressee by law enforcement officers posing as delivery men. 109 Once the 
addressee had assumed control of the table and the marijuana concealed 
within it, he was arrested and the table leg reopened without a warrant. 110 
The Chief Justice noted first that the original discovery of the drugs was 
lawful because customs officers have the "undoubted right to inspect all 
incoming goods at a port of entry." 111 Having done so, 
no protected privacy interest remains in contraband in a container 
once government officers lawfully have opened that container and 
identified its contents as illegal. The simple act of resealing the 
container to enable the police to make a controlled delivery does 
not operate to revive or restore the lawfully invaded privacy 
rights. 112 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Andreas search was that the 
surveillance of the table was not continuous. 113 Once the container entered 
the defendant's apartment, it was out of sight of the undercover officer. 114 
This gap in surveillance was viewed by Chief Justice Burger as constitutionally 
inconsequential because "perfect" controlled deliveries are virtually impos-
sible to achieve.t 15 Imperfect controlled deliveries are therefore acceptable 
unless a "substantial likelihood" exists that the contents of the container 
105. See id. at 99-101. 
106. Professor Amsterdam summarized the difficulty in applying Katz by describing the issue 
as "a value judgment . . . [namely,] whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced 
by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy 
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims 
of a free and open society." Amsterdam, supra note 100, at 403. 
107. 463 u.s. 765 (1983). 
108. /d. at 767. 
109. /d. 
110. /d. at 767-68. The agents were in the process of obtaining a search warrant when the 
defendant left his apartment with the container. /d. at 767. He was arrested immediately, and 
no warrant was ever procured. /d. at 767-68. 
Ill. /d. at 769 n.l. The container and table were inspected in Chicago, arriving by air from 
Calcutta. /d. at 767. 
112. ld. at 771. 
113. See id. at 767 (container out of sight of officers for between 30 and 45 minutes). 
114. /d. 
115. See id. at 772. 
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have been changed. 116 In fashioning this "substantial likelihood" standard, 
the Chief Justice called upon three "Fourth Amendment principles": 117 (1) 
the standard must be "workable," "reasonable," and "objective. " 118 (In 
common parlance, this meant that police officers should be able to under-
stand the standard (i.e., it should be a "bright-line")); 119 (2) the court should 
not find a privacy expectation where it would be "absurd" to do so; 120 and 
(3) the subjective belief of the individual police officer is unimportant. 121 
All of these "principles"122 can, of course, be easily applied to deny Fourth 
Amendment protection to a citizen. There will be considerable disagreement 
about what is "workable for application by rank-and-file, trained police 
officers. " 123 Determining whether a "substantial likelihood" exists that con-
tents of a container have changed during the time it is outside the view of 
a police officer hardly seems susceptible to a bright-line rule. Increasing the 
standard's rigidity would make it more "workable" for law enforcement, 
but it might also tempt a crime-control court to increase the length of the 
acceptable "surveillance gap" to accommodate the needs of law enforcement. 
Contrary to the assertion by the Chief Justice that "it would be absurd to 
recognize as legitimate an expectation of privacy where there is only a minimal 
probability that the contents of a particular container had been changed,'' 124 
a Supreme Court determined to conscientiously balance interests should be 
prepared to find that at least some brief "surveillance gaps" do revive 
privacy expectations. What is "absurd" to one court might be "reasonable" 
to another .125 And, complete rejection of the subjective views of the officer 
can be another way of saying that the Court will not permit the conclusions 
of those on the scene to interfere with its own judgment about how the case 
should turn out. 126 Chief Justice Burger not only found no "search" in 
116. See id. at 773. It has been argued that this formulation goes much farther than necessary 
to reach the decision. See Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 382-85. 
117. See Andreas, 463 U.S. at 772. 
ll8. See id. at 772-73. 
l19. See id. at 772. 
120. See id. at 773. 
121. !d.; see also Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 381-87 (explaining and analyzing components 
of "substantial likelihood.") 
122. It is unclear why these tenets of construction should be considered "Fourth Amendment 
principles." Of the three, only reasonableness is specifically included within the amendment's 
language, and it is a general principle that does not necessarily require that standards be either 
"workable" or "objective. 
123. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 772; see also id. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
124. !d. at 773. 
125. In other words, the objective "reasonableness" standard articulated by Chief Justice 
Burger sounds suspiciously like a subjective standard instead. It is interesting that the Chief 
Justice consistently referred in Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) to the expectation of 
privacy as "legitimate" rather than "reasonable." See Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 386-87. 
"Legitimate," like "absurd," connotes a value judgment inconsistent with reasonableness. /d. 
126. Presumably, the Chief Justice intended that the Court would not be controlled by an 
officer's subjective view that the surveillance gap was inconsequential. But apparently the Court 
would also not consider itself bound by an officer's subjective view that the gap was sufficient 
to make it very possible that the evidence has been moved. 
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Andreas, but also gratuitously erected a substantial barrier to future defen-
dants in other cases claiming that their privacy expectations might eventually 
become reasonable again. 127 
This inability or unwillingness to appreciate how citizens might "reason-
ably" view their own privacy is reflected in the other "no search" opinion 
authored by the Chief Justice. The defendant in California v. Ciraolo1u was 
also found in possession of marijuana, but the method of discovery was 
completely unlike that in Andreas. Police received an anonymous tip that 
Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his backyard. 129 Because the backyard was 
double-fenced, the officers, and any passersby, were unable to see into it.ll0 
One of the officers assigned to investigate flew over the house in a private 
plane at an altitude of 1000 feet, within navigable airspace. 131 From the air, 
he observed marijuana plants growing in the backyard. A search warrant 
was obtained, based on the observations and photographs made during the 
flight, and the plants were seized. 132 
Because the plants were growing within the "curtilage" of the residence, 
the "open fields" doctrine did not protect the activity from the requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment. 133 However, Chief Justice Burger concluded that 
[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced 
down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On 
this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expectation that 
his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable 
and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor .134 
In effect, the observation was not a search at all. 135 This must have come 
as a considerable shock to Mr. Ciraolo since the Court conceded that the 
sole purpose of the flight was to peer into his backyard to gather evidence 
of criminal activity. 136 Moreover, the Court noted that the defendant had 
127. As Professor Wasserstrom noted: 
[T]he Court 's analysis in Andreas suggests that once information about a person 
has been revealed through lawful surveillance, then he no longer has a protectable 
privacy interest in preventing repeated observations that would reveal no new 
information. Thus, for example, on the reasoning of Andreas, it would seem that 
if an undercover agent lawfully entered a person's house, and observed what was 
within it, then other agents could observe the interior of the home without invading 
a protectable privacy interest. 
Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 385. 
128. 476 u.s. 207 (1986). 
129. Id. at 209. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. at 209-10. 
133. /d. at 213. 
134. /d. at 213-14. 
135. The Chief Justice explained: "In an age where private and commercial flight in the 
public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants 
were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 
1,000 feet." /d. at 215. 
136. Chief Justice Burger summarily dismissed the argument that the advertence of the view 
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gone to some lengths to protect his yard from observation, and that the 
means were effective. 137 
While "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced 
down could have seen [the marijuana]," 138 the significant point in Ciraolo 
was that the view was not inadvertent. To the contrary, it was the sole 
reason for the flight. As Justice Powell noted in dissent, "Since Officer 
Shutz could not see into this private family area from the street, the Court 
certainly would agree that he would have conducted an unreasonable search 
had he climbed over the fence, or used a ladder to peer into the yard without 
first securing a warrant. " 139 If Justice Powell was right in this assumption, 
how is a view from an airplane constitutionally distinguishable? 140 
Phrasing the issue in terms of whether an airplane or a ladder was used 
to obtain a view makes the distinction appear ridiculous, as no doubt it was 
intended. But it also uncovers a serious problem inherent in the reasonable-
ness analysis. If Chief Justice Burger found Ciraolo's privacy expectation 
patently unreasonable, others, including four members of the Supreme Court, 
would not. 141 As Justice Powell observed, passengers on commercial flights 
"normally obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating 
glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they pass." 142 The Chief 
Justice displayed so little sympathy for the dissent's view that one wonders 
whether he was still more concerned with the legitimacy of the defendant's 
privacy expectation, and not whether it was objectively reasonable. 143 
The decisions in Andreas and Ciraolo, as well as the other cases in which 
the Burger Court refused to believe that a person's expectation of privacy 
was reasonable (or legitimate), 144 illustrate the relative ease with which this 
made a difference: "That the observation from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants 
and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana is irrelevant." /d. at 213. 
137. The California Court of Appeals held that the two fences and their configuration were 
"objective criteria from which we may conclude he manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy 
by any standard." People v. Ciraolo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986). The Chief Justice agreed that "[c]learly - and understandably- respondent has met 
the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful 
agricultural pursuits." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
138. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14 (emphasis added). 
139. /d. at 222 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
140. Justice Powell concluded that it must be the manner of surveillance that distinguished the 
cases for the majority. See id. at 222-23 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
141: See id. at 223-25 (Powell, J., dissenting) (defendant's privacy expectation was reasonable). 
The California Court of Appeals agreed with the dissenters. See People v. Ciraolo, 208 Cal. Rptr. 
93, 97-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). The views of the Supreme Court 
justices are discussed in BERNARD ScHWARTZ, THE AscENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT 
IN ACTION 351-52 (1990). 
142. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
143. See Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 386 (use of "legitimate" expectation of privacy standard 
both unilluminating and dangerous). Professor Wasserstrom asks rhetorically, "[H]ow can a 
criminal have a legitimate expectation of privacy when he has concealed contraband or evidence 
of crime?" /d. (emphasis in original). 
144. One of the most important of these was United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). In 
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flexible standard can be used to avoid the traditional strictures of the Fourth 
Amendment. The addition of reasonableness to the definition of "search" 
provided the court an effective tool with which to fight crime, or at least 
the reversal of convictions. 14s 
Reasonableness as a Procedural Barrier to Adjudication 
The third reasonableness analysis the Burger Court developed to deny 
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights violations was a procedural one: 
standing. Unlike the other uses to which reasonableness was put, its appli-
cation in determining whether a defendant had standing to bring a Fourth 
Amendment claim was the creation of the Burger Court. 146 
The Court inherited from the Warren Court a "bright-line" rule for 
determining whether the accused could invoke the exclusionary rule. 147 In 
Knotts, government agents placed a radio transmitter in a container of a "precursor" chemical to 
enable them to track the chemical to the place where it would be used. /d. at 277. As in Ciraolo, 
an airplane was used to visually and electronically track the progress and route of the car into 
which the chemical was loaded. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79. The beeper was tracked visually at 
first, but police discontinued visual surveillance when suspects began evasive moves. Police located 
the beeper again by electronic monitoring from a helicopter. /d. The container was eventually 
found in a secluded cabin. A search warrant was obtained for the cabin, and a drug laboratory 
was discovered in the ensuing search. /d. The Supreme Court held that the use of the "beeper" 
was not a search. /d. at 285 . The defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
container when the transmitter was placed inside, nor did he have any legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his movements on public roads, even if those movements were followed by electronic 
means. /d. at 282-85; see Arnold H. Lowey, Protecting Citizens from Cops and Crooks: An 
Assessment of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment During the 1982 
Term, 62 N.C. L. REv. 329, 352-53 (1984); Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 375-79. 
Knotts left unanswered the question of whether electronic aid in gathering information about a 
protected, private area is a search. The Supreme Court held that it is in United States v. Karo, 
468 u.s. 705 (1984). 
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court upheld the surreptitious use of "pen 
registers" on the grounds that persons have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone 
numbers dialed from their own phones. /d. at 741-46. The Court also found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in odors emanating from a person's property. United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696 (1983). For insight into the politics of the Court on the beeper cases, see ScHWARTZ, 
supra note 141, at 349-50. 
145. Regarding the electronic surveillance cases, Professor John Burkoff wrote: 
For my own part, I honestly do not know which is worse: (I) to conclude that the 
Court has utilized doublethink in ruling that the expectation of government electronic 
interception is official "reality," i.e., they know that that is not "really" true but 
it's the result-oriented way they are deciding fourth amendment cases in order to 
catch criminals, or, (2) to conclude that a majority of the Supreme Court - our 
bastion of last resort in the protection of constitutional liberties - honestly believe 
that the assumption that the government is not permitted to monitor our conver-
sations is so unreasonably naive as to be unworthy of constitutional protection. 
Burkoff, supra note 100, at 541. 
146. Specifically, the major standing opinions were authored by then Associate Justice Rehnquist. 
147. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Justice White later characterized the rule 
of Jones as one "relatively easily applied." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, 
J ., dissenting). 
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Jones v. United States, 148 the Warren Court considered the dilemma of the 
defendant charged with possession of illegal drugs. Such a defendant could 
establish his "standing" to contest the search for and seizure of those drugs 
by claiming that he owned them or had some possessory interest in them, 
but to do so would simultaneously establish the key element of the govern-
ment's case. 149 In order to avoid placing the defendant in this procedurally 
untenable position, the Court erected an "automatic" standing rule: If the 
defendant was charged with a possessory offense, he was automatically 
entitled to contest the manner in which the evidence had been recovered. 150 
Another way for the accused to establish standing was to prove that he had 
been "legitimately on the premises," 151 assuming that he had no possessory 
interest in the premises. While this alternative was less "bright-line" than 
the automatic standing rule in possession cases, m it too tended toward 
inclusion rather than exclusion. 153 
The purpose of the "automatic standing" component of Jones was un-
dercut by Simmons v. United States, 154 decided just a year before Warren 
Burger became Chief Justice. In Simmons, the Court resolved the standing 
dilemma faced by the accused charged with a nonpossessory crime: whether 
to testify (and thereby waive his Fifth Amendment privilege) at a suppression 
hearing in order to establish standing, or to forego testifying (and thereby 
waive vindication of his Fourth Amendment rights). 155 The accused would 
not be required to choose between his rights; his testimony at the suppression 
hearing was simply held inadmissible against him at trial. 156 
The logical upshot of Simmons was that automatic standing was no longer 
required for possessory offenses. If the accused's testimony was unavailable 
to the prosecution, he could freely assert the facts necessary to establish his 
standing. In United States v. Salvucci, 157 based on just that reasoning, the 
Burger Court abandoned automatic standing.l 58 
"Legitimately on premises" was also replaced by the Burger Court in 
Rakas v. Illinois. 159 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that 
148. 362 u.s. 2S7 (1960). 
149. See id. at 261-62. 
ISO. See id. at 264-6S. 
lSI. Justice Frankfurter wrote: "No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous 
enforcement of the criminal law wiU be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately on 
premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress .... " 
/d. at 267. 
IS2. "Legitimately on premises" was eventually abandoned with the assertion that "[w]e are 
rejecting blind adherence to a phrase which at most has superficial clarity and which conceals 
underneath that thin veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in any 
conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 147 (1978). 
IS3 . This feature of the rule was seen as a disadvantage by Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority in Rakas. /d. at 142 ("[W]e believe that the phrase 'legitimately on premises' coined in 
Jones creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights."). 
IS4. 390 u.s. 377 (1968). 
ISS. /d. at 394. 
IS6. /d. 
IS7. 448 u.s. 83 (1980). 
IS8. /d. at 89-90, 9S. 
IS9. 439 u.s. 128 (1978). 
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the rule swept too broadly, permitting even casual visitors to invoke the 
exclusionary rule for searches of premises in which they had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy. 160 Borrowing from the reasoning of Katz, Justice 
Rehnquist reiterated that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot 
be asserted vicariously. 161 However, not everyone at whom a search was 
"directed" could complain. 162 
Only those persons who enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the place to be searched could challenge the constitutionality of that search. 163 
Thus, the passengers in a vehicle could not contest a police search of the 
glove compartment unless they had some personal and reasonable privacy 
expectation in its contents. 164 This expectation might be reasonable because 
they owned or possessed the vehicle, and presumably it might be reasonable 
under some circumstances even if they did not. IM 
It seemed after Rakas that the Court was moving away from a formalistic 
approach to standing and toward one that was somewhat more restrictive, 
but that also potentially extended standing to persons without regard to their 
property rights. However, two years later in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 166 it 
became clear that "reasonable expectation of privacy" would be used to 
constrict the right of defendants to challenge searches and seizures. David 
Rawlings had placed his drugs in the purse of his female companion. 167 They 
were discovered by police during a search he claimed violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 168 The Supreme Court, in another opinion authored by Justice 
Rehnquist, denied standing to Rawlings on the grounds that he had no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the purse, even though 
he claimed ownership of the drugs. 169 
Under Jones, Rawlings would undoubtedly have been able to litigate the 
search issue, 170 either because it was a possessory offense giving him automatic 
160. /d. at 142. 
161. See id. at 133-34; see also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal). 
162. The Court rejected a "target" theory that would have granted standing to all persons who 
were the target of a search. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132-33. 
163. Justice Powell, joined in his concurrence by the Chief Justice, explained: 
The ultimate question, therefore, is whether one's claim to privacy from govern-
ment intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. As the 
dissenting opinion states, this standard "will not provide law eniorcement officials 
with a bright line between the protected and the unprotected." Whatever the 
application of this standard may lack in ready administration, it is more faithful to 
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment than a test focusing solely or primarily on 
whether the defendant was legitimately present during the search. 
/d. at 152 (Powell, J ., concurring) (citation omitted). 
164. See id. at 148. 
165. Justice Rehnquist emphatically denied that a property interest was necessary to establish 
standing. /d. at 149-50 n.17. 
166. 448 u.s. 98 (1980). 
167. /d. at 101. 
168. /d. at 103. 
169. Id. at 104-06. 
170. Justice Rehnquist conceded, "Prior to Rakas, petitioner might have been given 'stand-
ing' in such a case to challenge a 'search' that netted those drugs .... " /d. at 106. 
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standing, or because he had placed the drugs in the purse with the knowledge 
and perhaps the consent of the purse's owner. 171 Unfortunately for the 
defendant, on the same day the Court abandoned "legitimately on premises" 
in his case it also discarded "automatic standing" in Salvucci.172 However, 
even before Jones was decided, a defendant with an ownership interest in 
property searched could object to a search of that property. Rawlings made 
just this claim, 173 but the Court rejected it, demonstrating how "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" could be used to narrow standing beyond the tra-
ditional pre-Jones formulation: "While petitioner's ownership of the drugs 
is undoubtedly one fact to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically 
rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law ought to control 
the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment." 174 
Once the Court explicated the extent of its new standing rule, the result 
in Rawlings was anticlimactic. Rawlings' expectation of privacy in the purse, 
if in fact he had one, 175 was unreasonable. 176 Among the reasons for this 
conclusion, the Court mentioned that the defendant had ''never sought or 
received access to her purse prior to that sudden bailment"; that he had no 
right to exclude others from the purse; that in fact an acquaintance of the 
woman had looked through her purse on the morning of the arrest; and 
that ''the precipitous nature of the transaction hardly supports a reasonable 
inference that petitioner took normal precautions to maintain his privacy." 177 
One wonders just what precautions he might have taken short of clutching 
the purse in his own hands and refusing to let even its owner open it. Once 
again, the Burger Court had demonstrated its willingness and ability to use 
a reasonableness analysis to diminish the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 178 
Regardless of the way in which reasonableness was employed, the result 
was the same. Criminal defendants were denied the exclusionary sanction 
either because they could not bring a complaint, or because the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to their situation, or, if it did apply, because the 
Fourth Amendment was satisfied by however little protection had been 
provided by law enforcement. The context-based, sophisticated analysis that 
should have produced differing results tailored to each new situation ulti-
mately produced only one result: affirmance of convictions. 179 
171 . It was unclear from the testimony whether the woman had actually consented to carry 
the drugs in her purse. See id. at 101-02 n. l. 
172. See id. at 103 n.2. 
173. See id. at 105 . 
174. !d. at 105 . 
175. See id. at 104 n.3 (Rawlings testified that he did not expect the drugs in the purse to 
be free from governmental intrusion) . 
176. !d. at 104. 
177. !d. at 105 . 
178. See Burkoff, supra note 85 , at 166-67 (result of Burger Court's standing cases is 
decreased access to Fourth Amendment); Kamisar , supra note 7, at 74 (standing barrier grew 
more formidable than ever under Burger Court). 
179. It is certainly true that the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" can be found 
included in opinions in which a conviction was ultimately reversed, but the results in cases in 
which the decision turns on reasonableness itself are surprisingly uniform. 
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Bright-Line Rules: Formalism in Sheep's Clothing 
Bright-line rules usually differ from reasonableness analysis in their ease 
of application, predictable result, and fixed scope. A bright-line rule like, 
for example, the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States180 may 
liberally extend Fourth Amendment protections, or it may be formulated to 
greatly restrict the reach of the amendment. 181 In either event, its scope 
remains rigidly fixed, requiring reformulation of the rule to expand or 
contract the situations or persons it encompasses. 
The usual rationale for adopting a bright-line rule, however, is that it is 
clearer and simpler to apply correctly .182 It is a formulaic approach to decision 
making: If a police officer is confronted with factors X, Y, and Z, he may 
search without a warrant. The officer need not analyze whether the totality 
of circumstances makes a search reasonable, or whether the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment would be served by a warrantless search. 
Of course, the obvious problem with such an approach is that it trades 
consistency of result for flexibility, and ease of application for reasoning. 
"X, Y, and Z" are not always so easy to define, and the officer is left 
completely unguided when he or she is faced with X + n, Y, and Z. Because 
he or she does not understand why X, Y, and Z excused a warrant in the 
first place, it is impossible for the officer to extrapolate from the rule to 
decide whether a warrant is needed in a slightly different situation. 183 Despite 
these problems, the Burger Court displayed an eagerness to adopt bright-
line rules in search cases. 184 That the Court did so is surprising only because 
this development coincided with the development of reasonableness as a tool 
of Fourth Amendment analysis. 
On the day Warren Burger was sworn as Chief Justice of the United 
States, the Court decided Chime/ v. California. 185 Very much a Warren Court 
180. 362 U.S. 257 (1960); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, J., 
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist disagreed that the rule of Jones was a "thoroughly workable 
'bright line' test." See id. at 144-45 . 
181. For instance, the Supreme Court could adopt a standing rule permitting only persons 
with an ownership interest in the property searched to invoke the exclusionary rule. Such a 
rule would be relatively "bright-line" in its ease of application, but it would exclude those 
with mere possessory interest as well as all others except owners. 
182. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144-47 (bright-line rules have merit of easy application and the 
Court has not hesitated to use them in appropriate cases). 
183. When I worked as a police legal advisor, I was often asked by officers whether certain 
bright-line rules applied to situations slightly different from those that gave rise to the rule. 
My answers were often based more on political predictions about the results the Supreme 
Court was likely to see as desirable than on legal analysis . Like the officers I advised, I could 
discern no principles upon which the rules were grounded; hence, I could not predict the 
application of the rules in factually different circumstances. As Justice Marshall reminded the 
Court, "[A] rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] 
Amendment . . . obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, 
of police action as a means of constitutional regulation." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 249 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 17 (1968)) . 
184. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Rakas, "Where the factual premises for a rule are so 
generally prevalent that little would be lost and much would be gained by abandoning case-
by-case analysis , we have not hesitated to do so." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 147 . 
185. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
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decision, 186 Chime/ replaced a rule defining the scope of search incident to 
arrest with a more principled approach. 187 The rule under United States v. 
Rabinowitz188 was that a warrantless search conducted incident to an arrest 
could extend to the area in "possession" or "control" of the arrestee. 189 As 
in the Rabinowitz case, this meant that if a person was arrested in his 
residence, a thorough search of the entire residence could be conducted 
without a warrant, despite the fact that the arrestee was present in only one 
room and under the control of the police. 190 Rabinowitz was, in effect, a 
kind of bright-line "area" rule. If a person was arrested, a certain area 
could be searched, but there was no particularly compelling reason for 
searching that area in many cases. 
Noting the "high function" of a search warrant, 191 the Supreme Court in 
Chime/ articulated two important governmental interests that are served by 
permitting a warrantless search incident to arrest. 192 The first of these is 
protecting the arresting officer from any weapons the arrestee might obtain 
and use. 193 The second is preventing the arrestee from destroying or concealing 
evidence. 194 The scope of a search incident to arrest should, the court 
concluded, be circumscribed by those purposes advanced by the warrant 
exception. 195 Otherwise, the "high function" of the warrant should be pre-
served.196 The "area" rule of Rabinowitz had been replaced with a "pur-
posive" rule. 
Applying the Chime/ "rule" that only the area within the immediate 
control of the arrestee could be searched incident to the arrest was not 
especially difficult. The arresting officer's actions could be guided by the 
purposes underlying the exception. Only those areas into which an arrestee 
could reach or lunge could be searched without a warrant. 197 If the arrestee 
186. See Israel, supra note 7, at 1389 (Chime! narrowed one of " most significant exceptions 
to the warrant requirement") . 
187. See Chime!, 395 U.S . at 759-68 . 
188. 339 u.s. 56 (1950). 
189. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950), overruled by Chime! v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 12. 
190. See Rabinowitz, 339 U.S . at 59-61. 
191. Chime!, 395 U.S. at 761. 




196. /d.; see Israel, supra note 7, at 1392 (Burger Court decisions failed to carry forward 
Chime! emphasis on warrant). 
197. Chime/, 395 U.S. at 763 . Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, explained: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use 
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might 
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated . In addition, it is entirely 
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area 
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a 
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could not obtain a weapon or reach destructible evidence, there was no 
constitutional point in permitting a warrantless search. 198 While the rule could 
be applied correctly only by understanding the purposes which justified its 
existence, it was a conceptually simple rule. 
The first significant Burger Court cases199 dealing with search incident to 
arrest were United States v. Robinson200 and Gustafson v. Florida, 201 both 
decided the same day. These cases tested the Burger Court's resolve to adhere 
to the "purposive" approach of Chime/. 
The defendant in Robinson was seen driving a car by a police officer who 
knew that Robinson's license had been revoked.202 The officer stopped 
Robinson and arrested him for "operating after revocation and obtaining a 
permit by misrepresentation."203 In a search of the arrestee's breast coat 
pocket, the officer discovered a "crumpled up cigarette package," which he 
opened.204 Inside the package, the officer found gelatin capsules containing 
heroin, for which Robinson was ultimately convicted. 205 The Supreme Court 
upheld the warrantless search of the defendant's person as incident to a 
drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting 
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample 
justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area "within 
his immediate control" - construing that phrase to mean the area from within 
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 
/d. at 762-63 . 
198. Justice Stewart concluded: 
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room 
other than that in which an arrest occurs - or, for that matter, for searching 
through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room 
itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made 
only under the authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to judicial proc-
esses" mandated by the Fourth Amendment requires no less. 
/d. at 763 (footnote omitted). 
199. The Court decided Cupp v. Murphy in 1973 . Murphy is not clearly a search incident 
to arrest case, and if it is one, its result is limited by its unusual facts . See Lewis et a!., supra 
note 2, at 16-19. The defendant in Murphy was not under arrest when he went to the police 
station and fingernail scrapings were taken from him without his consent and without a 
warrant . Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292 (1973). Justice Stewart, writing the plurality 
opinion, cited Chime/ as controlling the scope of the evidence seizure, but he also noted that 
the police had probable cause to believe Murphy had murdered his wife, and that the dried 
blood under his fingernails was "highly evanescent evidence" which could be recovered by a 
"very limited intrusion." !d. at 295-96. Justice Stewart would not have permitted a full search 
incident to arrest , but he believed this limited pre-arrest search was reasonable. /d. The most 
disquieting feature of the case is the willingness of the Court to apply a search incident to 
arrest rationale to a seizure occurring long before any formal arrest. See Lewis et a!. , supra 
note 2, at 16-18. 
200. 414 u.s. 218 (1973). 
201. 414 u.s. 260 (1973). 
202 . Robinson, 414 U.S . at 220. 
203. /d. 
204. /d. at 221-23 . 
205. !d. 
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lawful arrest, refusing to adopt the Court of Appeals' view that the scope 
of such a search is limited to a "protective frisk. " 206 
Based on the reasoning of Chime/, a search incident to arrest could extend 
to all places in the immediate control of the arrestee, which would surely 
include his clothing, for the purposes of discovering weapons or destructible 
evidence. 207 The interesting question posed by Robinson was not whether the 
search of a person incident to arrest should be limited to a "protective frisk" 
only, but whether the "purposes" served by permitting the warrantless search 
and articulated in Chime/ would define the scope of the search. 
Since Robinson had been arrested for a relatively minor traffic offense, 
and one unlikely to involve a weapon, why should the arresting officer be 
allowed to search for a weapon? Justice Rehnquist, after citing statistics 
regarding the danger of traffic stops, 208 addressed the point briefly by as-
serting: 
It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far 
greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the 
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police 
station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting 
from the typical Terry-type stop. This is an adequate basis for 
treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search justifi-
cation.209 
The unstated point was, of course, that the reason for the search, whether 
the detention be fleeting or prolonged, was to protect the officer. If a 
warrantless search is unnecessary to satisfy that purpose, it violates the 
Chime/ version of the Fourth Amendment.210 
A tidier, more easily applied rule would ignore the purposes of Chime/, 
abandon a case-by-case inquiry into whether a particular arrestee might be 
armed, and permit the intrusion in every case. 211 An indication that this kind 
of bright-line rule might be applied in search incident to arrest cases appeared 
in Robinson: 
206. /d. at 226-27 . 
207. See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) . 
208. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 n.5; see also Edward Chase, The Burger Court, the 
Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections , 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518, 
540-45 (1977). 
209. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35 . This passage reflects the view expressed by Justice 
Rehnquist in conference. See ScHWARTZ, supra note 141 , at 353-54. 
210. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 239 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(scheme of Fourth Amendment is meaningful only when police are subjected to judicial 
scrutiny); Chime) v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) ("adherence to judicial processes" 
mandated by Fourth Amendment requires warrant for search beyond scope of search incident 
to arrest principle) . 
211 . "Indeed, the majority opinions in Robinson and Gustafson may reflect a lesson 
suggested in several Warren Court opinions - the need for flat, simple rules that can easily 
be applied by police officers." Israel, supra note 7, at 1397; see also Yackle, supra note 63, 
at 401. 
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A police officer's determination as to how and where to search 
the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a 
quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not 
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of 
each step in the search. The authority to search the person incident 
to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm 
and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may 
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation 
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person 
of the suspect. 212 
85 
The extent to which this bright-line rule would control search incident to 
arrest was exposed in Gustafson v. F/orida, 213 the companion case. Gustafson 
argued, under virtually the same facts as Robinson, that no evidentiary 
purpose was served by the search that uncovered marijuana in a cigarette 
box in the arrestee's pocket.214 Gustafson had also been arrested for failure 
to have his driver's license in his possession while driving. 215 The court upheld 
the search incident to arrest, explaining that, "as our decision in Robinson 
makes clear, the arguable absence of 'evidentiary' purpose for a search 
incident to a lawful arrest is not controlling. " 216 The import of Robinson 
and Gustafson was that, at least for a search of the person of an arrestee, 
the purposes identified by the Court in Chime/ need not be advanced by the 
warrantless search at all. The arrestee could be searched thoroughly without 
regard for whether a weapon or destructible evidence might be uncovered.217 
The decisions in Robinson and Gustafson may not have been faithful to 
the probable cause and warrant requirement, but their rule was inclusive and 
simple: If a person is placed under custodial arrest, he may be searched 
without a warrant. 218 The peripheral issues left open included whether the 
person searched had been placed under custodial arrest, 219 whether the search 
was "incident" to the arrest/20 and what the scope might be for a search 
that extended beyond the person of the arrestee. 
The last of these questions was answered by the Court for vehicle searches 
in New York v. Belton.221 In Belton, a police officer stopped a car for 
212. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
213. 414 u.s. 260 (1973). 
214. /d. at 263. 
215 . /d. at 262. 
216. /d. at 265 . 
217. The search for weapons need not be limited to a "protective frisk." A complete search 
could even be conducted of places, like a crumpled cigarette package, where a weapon almost 
certainly could not be hidden. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233-36. 
218. See Chase, supra note 208, at 541-42. 
219. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (de-
fendant's custodial arrest might not have been lawful). 
220. The Court has been very liberal in applying the exception to searches conducted before 
and some time after the defendant's arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S . 800 
(1974) (search conducted ten hours after arrest); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (person 
searched not yet formally arrested). 
221. 453 u.s. 454 (1981). 
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speeding.222 He discovered that none of the occupants was the registered 
owner of the vehicle or related to its owner. 223 When the officer spotted an 
envelope on the floor marked "Supergold" and smelled burnt marijuana, 
he ordered all four occupants out of the car and placed them under arrest. 224 
During his search of the passenger compartment, he looked inside a zippered 
jacket pocket and discovered cocaine.225 
Purporting to apply Chime/ to evaluate the search of the passenger com-
partment made incident to the arrest of the occupants, the Court concluded: 
Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles 
inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment 
of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, 
within ''the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to 
grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]." Chime/, 395 U.S. at 763. 
In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases 
requires, we read Chime/'s definition of the limits of the area that 
may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we 
hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest 
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile. 226 
Containers within the passenger compartment are also subject to warrantless 
search under Belton because, the Court explained, if the passenger com-
partment is within reach of the arrestee, so is a container within it. 227 
The problem with the Court's logic is that it proceeds from the faulty 
premise that the passenger compartment is within the reach of the arrestee. 228 
No police officer would be so foolish as to permit any arrestee to reenter 
his vehicle without being under the closest supervision. Nor would any police 
officer allow an arrestee to stand unguarded within lunging distance of the 
passenger compartment. In short the "area of immediate control" definition 
of Chime/ is "unworkable"229 in this context only because it does not allow 
the police to search the passenger compartment without a warrant. 230 
222. /d. at 455. 
223. Id. 
224. /d. at 455-56. 
225. /d. at 456. 
226. /d. at 460 (footnote omitted). 
227. /d. 
228. There is no evidence in the Belton opinion that any of the four arrestees would have 
been permitted to reenter the car, or that they were within reach of the passenger compartment. 
229. See Chime/, 453 U.S. at 460 ("courts have found no workable definition of 'the area 
within the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of 
an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant"). 
230. "Immediate control" is no more difficult to determine in vehicle cases than in residential 
arrest cases. If the arrestee can reach or lunge to obtain a weapon or destructible evidence 
from the vehicle passenger compartment, that part into which he can reach or Junge is within 
the arrestee's immediate control. See Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Of 
course, no self-respecting police officer would ever permit an arrestee to be within reach of 
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Belton, like Robinson and Gustafson, adopts a bright-line approach231 that 
works to the advantage of law enforcement. All three cases virtually abandon 
the purposes behind search incident to arrest and return the exception to a 
mechanical rule of the sort the Court rejected in deciding Chime/. Once a 
person is placed under custodial arrest, his or her person may be searched 
thoroughly; the area in his or her immediate control may be searched 
thoroughly; and, if the arrest involved a vehicle, the passenger compartment 
may be searched thoroughly.232 None of these rules of scope need have the 
least thing to do with any constitutional policy reason for dispensing with a 
warrant. 
Formalism requires the logical person to disregard the dictates of reason 
and blindly accept outcomes in the interest of expediency. However, if the 
return to a formalistic evaluation made more certain the job of law enforce-
ment, or the application of the exclusionary rule, it would have at least that 
virtue. Unfortunately, once the Court applied its search incident to arrest 
formalism beyond the person of the arrestee, the rule lost even its claim to 
clarity. 233 
This difficulty of application is reflected in the Belton opinion. 234 The 
Court felt constrained to note, for example, that the lawfulness of the 
custodial arrest had not been questioned;m that it was not overruling Chime/ 
(a mistake any reader of the opinion might have made);236 that "container" 
includes any "object capable of holding another object";237 and that the 
holding extends only to the passenger compartment, and not to the trunk.238 
Even with these guidelines, the application of Belton is difficult once the 
factual basis varies from that in the decision. Suppose that the glove com-
partment or console within the passenger compartment is locked.239 The 
Court says it is a "container," but is it subject to search incident to arrest? 
If the purposes of Chime/ have any meaning, the answer will usually be 
"no." But if Belton has completely cut the exception loose from Chime/'s 
doctrinal moorings, perhaps it would not matter if these "containers" were 
welded shut. 
the passenger compartment of a car from which he has just been arrested unless the officer 
is attempting to manipulate the Chime/ area to justify a warrantless search. 
2Jl. See ScHWARTZ, supra note 141, at 354 (" Need for a case-by-case assessment was largely 
eliminated" in Belton). 
232. For purposes of searching containers within vehicles, it makes no difference whether 
the container could hold a weapon. Belton, 453 U.S .. at 461. 
233. See Steven D. ·clymer, Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 105, 139-40 (1982) 
(bright-line rule of Belton leaves questions unanswered). 
234. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61. 
235 . ld. at 460 n.2. 
236. /d. at 460 n.3. 
237. /d. at 460 n.4. 
238. /d. at 460 n.4. 
239. See Clymer, supra note 233, at 139. 
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Why is the trunk not within the "area" that can be searched incident to 
arrest? It cannot be because it is outside the "immediate control" of the 
arrestee because that fact makes no difference when the sanctity of the 
passenger compartment is at stake. Is it only because the Court says so? 
If control is unimportant, may a police officer search the passenger 
compartment hours, or days, after a custodial arrest?240 And what is a 
"custodial" arrest? How does it differ from a "noncustodial" arrest?241 
These questions are not merely rhetorical. Real cases turn upon the an-
swers, and real police officers have no way to derive the answers.242 The rule 
is not built on a doctrinal foundation, and for that reason it is less clear 
than the "unworkable" rule of Chime/. 243 A reasonably trained police officer 
could make intelligent predictions about the answers to most of these ques-
tions by using the purposive approach of Chime/. The answers might some-
times mean that the scope of the search was excessive and the exclusionary 
rule would be applied; in other cases, hopefully in most, the officer would 
correctly limit his or her search in a way that would satisfy the needs 
underlying the exception. 
The Burger Court's Fourth Amendment Legacy 
These examples of the development of reasonableness analysis and bright-
line rules, while not exhaustive, illustrate the character and texture of the 
Burger Court interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. Certainly, no "strat-
egy" can be ascribed to any one Justice, or to the Court as a whole, on the 
basis of these decisions alone, but the patterns they form are at least imperfect 
empirical evidence of the decision making proclivities of that Court. 
It is important to remember that the Burger Court did not invent either 
reasonableness analysis or formalism. Moreover, neither method is "evil" 
nor necessarily antithetical to the principles of the Fourth Amendment. They 
are merely modes of analysis (or, in the case of formalism, nonanalysis) 
which can, when used with care and understanding, be useful tools of 
adjudication. 
The Burger Court misused reasonableness by not really using it at all. Its 
decisions employing reasonableness substantively to defeat the probable cause, 
240. In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a search 
incident to arrest of a vehicle conducted ten hours after the arrestee had been taken to the 
station. /d. at 803. The search may be made incident to arrest "even after a substantial period 
of time has elapsed." /d. at 807. Since the vehicle is out of the control of the arrestee as soon 
as he is removed from the scene, why is the period limited at all? Is the issue merely an 
evidentiary one, and not a constitutional question? 
241. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals confronted this issue and held that routine traffic 
stops are not custodial absent some objective evidence that the officer intends to take the 
vehicle occupant to the stationhouse. See Linnett v. State, 647 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1983). 
242. See George Kannar, Liberals and Crime: The Reclaiming of an Issue, NEw REPUBLIC, 
Dec. 19, 1988, at 20-21 (exceptions like search incident to arrest make it impossible for officers 
to figure out how to act). 
243 . See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1973) (definition of "immediate control" 
not "workable" in vehicle search incident to arrest cases). 
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warrant, and individualized suspicion requirements have such a quality of 
sameness that the most sympathetic reader cannot avoid feeling that no real 
effort at balancing was made. The cases are too consistent in their outcomes 
to lend authenticity to the Court's claim that a careful weighing of interests 
was being undertaken in each case. 244 
This cynicism could have been ameliorated by evidence in the other uses 
of reasonableness that the Burger Court was shaping a new, but equally 
principled, vision of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the cases defining 
search share the remarkable consistency of those recognizing "special needs."245 
All of them took a little piece of privacy;246 in Professor Alschuler's words, 
they waged "guerilla warfare" on the Fourth Amendment. 247 Because Chief 
Justice Burger contributed significantly to the substantive and definitional 
use of reasonableness, he bears much personal responsibility for leading the 
Court in this direction. 
In the standing cases also, the Chief Justice routinely voted with Justice 
Rehnquist to abandon a more inclusive, but clearer rule, and adopt a more 
exclusive and vaguer analytical method. This is not very revealing in itself, 
but taken as part of a pattern of decisional choices, it confirms that his 
philosophical bearings were in favor of law enforcement and opposed to 
those who were presumed to be factually guilty.248 
Perhaps Chief Justice Burger's noted antipathy for the exclusionary rule249 
motivated him to find ways to insure that the Fourth Amendment was not 
244. " When measure after measure is removed from one side of the balance without tipping 
the scales, it can only be because gravity is stayed by an interested hand." Gerald S. Reamey, 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court 's Lesson on School Searches, 16 ST. MARY's L.J. 
933, 949 (1985). 
245. As Professor Yale Kamisar observed: 
Even more disquieting than the manner in which the present Court has narrowed 
the scope of the exclusionary rule is the way in which it has narrowed the 
substantive protection provided by the Fourth Amendment. By taking a crabbed 
view of what constitutes a "search" or "seizure," the Court has put no consti-
tutional restraints at all on certain investigative techniques that may uncover an 
enormous quantity of personal information. 
Kamisar, supra note 7, at 74; see also ScHWARTZ, supra note 141, at 349-52. 
246. Professor Wasserstrom wrote of the Burger Court's use of reasonableness in the 
definition of "search": 
The Burger Court, however, has not taken advantage of the added flexibility 
which a sliding scale test of reasonableness should afford. On the contrary, the 
Court has exempted a variety of police practices from even the fourth amendment 
requirement of reasonableness, by ruling that they are not "searches and seizures" 
at all , and, so, the Court has left the police free to act in many areas as arbitrarily 
as they wish. 
Wasserstrom, supra note 15, at 310. 
247 . Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1442. 
248. See Chase, supra note 208, at 588 (Burger Court more concerned with "factual guilt" 
than with "legal guilt"). 
249. Warren Burger's most noted attack on the exclusionary rule came in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J ., dissenting). However, even before his appointment to the Supreme Court, his 
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violated, or that the criminal defendant had no chance to litigate the violation 
to a court. 250 Whether these decisions are properly viewed as indirect attacks 
on the exclusionary rule, 251 and there were many direct attacks by the Burger 
Court,252 or as collateral instances in which the Fourth Amendment was 
modified to achieve a desired result, the net result was the weakening of the 
amendment's prohibition.253 
Bright-line rules that make the protections of the Fourth Amendment more 
available, or expand the substantive reach of those protections, might not 
infringe on the ultimate purposes of the right. However, it is almost inevitable 
that formalistic, formulaic, or bright-line rules will, if given much scope and 
if designed to circumscribe the rights of the individual, prove inconsistent 
with the principles of the Fourth Amendment. This is so because by their 
nature these rules operate mechanically to decide the endless variety of cases 
involving search and seizure. The weighing or balancing of privacy interest 
is done abstractly and prospectively. A court convinced that law enforcement 
requires more latitude to effectively combat crime will likely skew the design 
of the formula to comport with its criminal justice perspective, and that 
skewing will eventually exacerbate the mistakes that inhere in this crude form 
of decision making. If bright-line rules are to be used at all in search and 
seizure cases, they should initially favor the individual rather than the state. 
Better yet, the Court should simply avoid such rules unless it is certain that 
the rule contemplated will do more constitutional good than harm. 
The Burger court used bright-line rules, as it had reasonableness analysis, 
to advance its crime control agenda.254 Evidence of this is found in the 
views were well known. See Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. 
L. REv. I (1964); see also Burkoff, supra note 85, at 160-61. 
250. See Burkoff, supra note 85, at 160-61; LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 100, at 80-84. 
251. See Clymer, supra note 233, at 143-44 (Supreme Court's reluctance to apply exclusionary 
rule led to expanded warrant exceptions in vehicle search cases). 
252. See supra note 250. 
253. Professor George Kannar summarized the effect of warrant exceptions like search 
incident to arrest on the exclusionary rule: 
The Burger Court consistently failed to recognize that exceptions of this sort 
can only be kept from swallowing the rule if they are kept narrowly - and clearly 
- limited. Out of a misplaced zeal to punish individual malefactors, it began 
behaving like a neighborhood police court, cluttering its docket with insignificant 
cases simply because it could not bear the sight of particular individuals going 
free. In the process, the Republican-dominated Court converted Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence into the impossibly confused quagmire it is today - piling 
exception upon exception, creating exceptions to exceptions, until not even the 
legal treatise writers can figure out exactly what the law is, or conscientious 
officers figure out how to act. In short, it was the conservative Burger Court, 
not the liberal Warren Court, that made search and seizure law a labyrinth of 
muddled "technicalities." And then opponents of the exclusionary rule seized 
upon the mess conservatives had themselves created as an excuse for abolishing 
the rule completely. 
Kannar, supra note 242, at 20-21. 
254. Professor Geoffrey Stone observed: "If there is one area in which the Burger Court's 
decisions seem most clearly to reflect a self-conscious 'agenda,' it is in the realm of constitu-
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abandonment of a bright-line standing rule that tended toward inclusion of 
claims. 255 The Burger Court replaced that rule with a reasonableness analysis 
that tended to exclude Fourth Amendment challenges.256 
The dismantling of the Jones257 rule was not, however, a sign that the 
Burger Court disapproved of bright-line rules generally. The Court moved 
deliberately in the area of search incident to arrest to undo the Warren 
Court's purposive analysis and replace it with a bright-line rule.258 In Bel-
ton, 259 Robinson, 26/J and Gustafson, 261 the Court systematically erected "area" 
rules for search incident to arrest, first for the person of the arrestee, and 
eventually for the arrestee's vehicle. With scarcely a word of explanation, 
other than that the previous rule was "unworkable, " 262 the Burger Court 
refused to impose on law enforcement the duty to think and consider before 
searching. 263 
There was no noticeable hue and cry from the public protesting the Court's 
denigration of its privacy rights, and for several reasons none could have 
been expected. Even lawyers not involved in the criminal justice process 
would hardly be perturbed by the apparently minor, although numerous, 
changes in the Fourth Amendment during the Burger years. The public could 
hardly be alarmed by the restriction of the "standing" requirement, or even 
the expansion of the search incident to arrest exception, since relatively few 
people have heard of either. Moreover, the characterization of the Burger 
Court as a "law and order" Court in search and seizure cases, or that it 
threatened the exclusionary rule, would more likely have been applauded 
than denounced. Even knowledgeable commentators who agreed that the 
Court was denigrating the Fourth Amendment took comfort in the Fifth 
and, especially, the Sixth Amendment cases where they discerned a more 
balanced approach. 264 The shape of the down-sized "new" Fourth Amend-
ment is only now becoming clear. 
tiona) criminal procedure. " Stone, supra note I , at 12; see also Chase, supra note 208, at 546 
(Robinson represents movement toward elimination of Fourth Amendment as a restriction on 
conviction). 
255 . See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 144-45 (1978) (abandoned rule of Jones; not a workable bright-line test). 
256. See supra note 178. 
257. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (standing " automatic" if possession offense; 
otherwise, granted if accused "legitimately on premises") . 
258 . See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Clymer, supra note 233, at 133-34. 
259. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) . 
260. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) ." 
261. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
262. Ironically, the bright-line standing rule of Jones was "unworkable," so it was replaced 
by an ad hoc reasonableness analysis. See Rokas, 439 U.S. at 144-45. On the other hand, the 
ad hoc analysis of Chime/ was " unworkable" for car searches, so it was replaced by a bright-
line rule. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
263. While purporting to respect law enforcement, the underlying message of the bright-line 
cases is that the Burger Court considered police officers incapable of analyzing factual situations 
and making constitutional decisions . 
264. See Alschuler, supra note 13; Friedman, supra note 12; Israel, supra note 7, at 1387 
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The ascent of reasonableness analysis and selective use of bright-line rules 
during the Burger Court years may have been the result of a conscious 
strategy to accomplish with small attacks on unknown places exactly what 
could have been done by overruling Mapp v. Ohio. 26s Or it may have been, 
as some argue, the result of an "essential lack of vision and commitment. " 266 
Perhaps it was something in-between.267 Perhaps the Fourth Amendment 
decisions of the Burger Court were produced by a floundering Court that 
eventually saw what it could do and began to appreciate it for a true strategy. 
And perhaps the Burger Court's example has become the Rehnquist Court's 
Fourth Amendment modus operandi. In any event, the search and seizure 
decisions of the Burger Court, inelegant by comparison with those of the 
Warren Court, radically altered not just the reach and shape of the Fourth 
Amendment, but also the process by which search issues are decided. The 
law and order agenda of the Court was not hidden, but its results were 
obscured by the narrow focus of the decisions and the patient use of strategies 
of confusion. When the smoke cleared, much of the Fourth Amendment 
had disappeared, but not by magic. 
(Burger Court's search and seizure decisions probably more sharply criticized than any other 
decisions involving regulation of police practices). 
265 . 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Professor Edward Chase suggested that "although the major 
doctrinal stroke of eliminating the exclusionary rule entirely in fourth amendment cases, or of 
refusing to apply it when the police act in good faith, has not occurred, enough has been 
done to render the fourth amendment virtually meaningless to the criminal defendant." Chase, 
supra note 208, at 551. 
266. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 1449-50. 
267. Professor Edward Chase has described the Burger Court's criminal procedure decisions 
as "wholesale and rash," reflecting a "preoccupation with accurate results in individual cases." 
Chase, supra note 208, at 519. According to Chase, "This generates a set of consistent results 
across doctrinal lines, a consistent method of decisionmaking, and a particular vision of the 
criminal process." /d. 
